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Schellace: Voting Rights

THE PALE IMPACT OF RECENT CASE LAW ON
THE ASCENDANCY OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:

Let's move on now to something completely different, the
Voting Rights cases. They have a real effect on The Suffolk
County Legislature as far as the districts are concerned. As you
know, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors was invalidated by
Judge Arthur Spatt of the federal district court.
To discuss the Supreme Court cases that came down this past
year on the subject of voting rights, our speaker is Frank Schellace
who is the law secretary to Justice Kenneth D. Molloy of the New
York State Supreme Court. He is an expert in this field, and I
should tell you that on behalf of The Institute of Local and
Suburban Law, he made a presentation in seeking to have this law
school retained as a consultant with the Commission on
Government Revision, the body charged with creating a new
government for Nassau County. I am sure, of course, that you are
probably aware that we never achieved it, but he was to be the
person that I would work with had we been retained. He had
appeared at all the public meetings and work sessions of the
commission and was invited to testify as an expert at a number of
the public hearings. I should also add that he was granted amicus
curiae status by Judge Arthur Spatt in that case. So I now introduce
you to Frank Schellace.
FrankN. Schellace, Esq.*:
INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Judge. This is a subject that I know from my days of
law school which was not one that was covered in great detail.

445
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What I will attempt to do initially is to give a brief overview of the
Voting Rights Act. I will then explain the impact of two major
cases that came down this past Term by the Supreme Court which
pertain to section 2 of this act on vote dilution.
The Voting Rights Act arose as a remedy to racially
discriminatory election practices, particularly in the south. The
enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment 1 after the Civil War,
eliminated many statutory obstacles to African-American voting.
Nevertheless, state and local officials soon utilized impediments to
voter registration as a means of denying African-Americans the
right to vote. Such impediments included the use of literacy tests
and grandfather clauses. 2 In the early 'sixties, the United States
Department of Justice challenged the use of literacy tests in voter
registration on a case-by-case basis. 3 Because this approach proved
4
ineffective, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
* Law Secretary to New York State Supreme Court Justice Kenneth D.
Molloy, 10th Judicial District. B.S. State University of N.Y. at Stony Brook,
1975; J.D. Hofstra University of Law, 1978. The views expressed in this article
are the author's and not necessarily the views of Justice Molloy or the New
York State Supreme Court. The author wishes to express his thanks to research
assistant Morris E. Fischer, and Stacey Klein of the Touro Law Review for their
timely and excellent work. The author also wishes to express his gratitude to the
tireless efforts of the members of the Nassau County Commission on
Government Revision and one of their lead consultants, Debra A. Levine.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. Section one provides: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude." Id.
2. See People ex reL Chadbourne v. Voorhis, 236 N.Y. 437, 141 N.E. 907
(1923) (emphasizing the requirement of a voter to fill out a certificate of literacy
to qualify to vote); Ferayomi v. Walter, 121 Misc. 602, 202 N.Y.S. 91 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1923) (recognizing that particular voters have to pass literacy
requirement).
3. See Apache County v. United States, 256 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1966)
(holding that Apache County official used the literacy test in a discriminatory
fashion to his own advantage).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1986). Section 1973 states in relevant part:
(a) No voting qualification.., or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results
in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color... ;
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Again, as I said a moment ago, the Act was to remedy racially
discriminatory election practices. The two central provisions of the
Voting Rights Act are sections 2 and 5. Section 2 forbids any state
or political subdivision from imposing or implying voting
qualifications or prerequisites to any voting standard, practice, or
procedure which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of
any citizen to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a
5
language minority.
Section 2 has always been significant in the area of redistricting.
Redistricting and reapportionment are two processes that take place
every ten years following the census. The census determines the
population of the entire country by state. As populations shift from
state to state following each census there is a reapportionment of
the number of congressional districts each state has. The final
process of redistricting is the establishment of the precise
geographical boundaries of each congressional and state legislative
district.6 Historically, a number of states have sought to dilute the
(b) A violation of subsection (a)... is established if... shown that the
political processes leading to... election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) ....
(c) Whenever a State or political subdivision.., shall enact... any
voting qualification ... or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to
voting different from that in force.

.

on November 1, 1964,... such

State or subdivision may institute an action for a declaratory judgment
that such ... practice, or procedure does not have the ... effect of

denying.., the right to vote on account of race or color ....
Id.
5. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437. Prior
to the 1982 amendments the Act provided: "No voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Id.
6. Redistricting is distinguished from reapportionment. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1137 (6th ed. 1990). "Reapportionment" is defined as
a realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes
in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality
of representation (i.e. one person, one vote mandate). A new
apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives among States
'according to their respective numbers', is required by Art. 1, § 2 of the
U.S. Constitution after every decennial census.
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strength of African-American voters by establishing districting
7
lines in a disfavorable way towards this group of voters.
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires certain states and the
various political subdivisions of those states that seek to enact or
administer voting qualifications or prerequisites, to obtain
preclearance from the United States Department of Justice. 8 The
specific Act states that the requirement pertains to those states that
Congress identified as ones that have traditionally erected
discriminatory barriers in front of African-American voters.
A section 5 state or a political subdivision of such state could
bypass this section 5 preclearance requirement by obtaining a
declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 9 While obtaining such declaratory judgment
is possible, it is a much more timely and costly procedure.

Id.
7. See Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994). The court noted
that the Supreme Court had recognized two grounds on which redistricting
might be violative of the Equal Protection Clause. First, some voters had less
weight than those cast by voters in other districts where districts were not equal
in population. Second, even where districts were of equal population, they were
sometimes drawn for the purpose or resulted in unfair "dilution" or canceling
out certain voting weights. Id. at 421-22.
8. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1986)). Section 5 provides in
pertinent part:
[A] state or subdivision may institute an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that
such qualification, prerequisite, standard practice, or procedure does not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race or color ......
Id. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491 (1992) (holding that
all changes in voting must be precleared under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
however, § 5 does not apply to changes with regard to the allocation of power
among governmental officials).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1986).
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I. THE LANDMARK VOTING RIGHTS CASE OF CITY
OF MOBILE V BOLDEN AND THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE
In a case entitled City of Mobile v. Bolden,10 decided in 1980, a
plurality of the Supreme Court clarified the point that a plaintiff
challenging a state's redistricting by way of the Voting Rights Act,
must establish discriminatory intent. Namely, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the purpose behind the redistricting was to
minimize the voting strength of minorities.
Prior to this landmark case, it was unclear whether such plaintiffs
were required to establish discriminatory intent, or whether they
could rely on the fact that such redistricting resulted in
discrimination against minorities. On one hand, the Bolden Court
pointed to earlier cases upon which it could have been "suggested"
that disproportionate effects alone could establish a vote dilution
claim. 11 However, the Bolden Court explained that none of these
earlier decisions were inconsistent with the "discriminatory intent"
requirement. 12
On the other hand, the Supreme Court stated in another voting
rights case, Thornburg v. Gingles,13 that in fact a pre-Bolden
plaintiff did not have to show that the state or political subdivision
10. 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that disproportionate effects alone are
insufficient to establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution).
11. The Supreme Court cited White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), as a
prime example. In White, the Court affirmed that the one-person-one-vote plan
unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of minorities. Id. at 765. The Court
also noted that a Fifth Circuit case, Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1973), was decided upon a misunderstanding that it was not necessary to
show a discriminatory purpose. The Court established that this principle of
"discriminatory intent" was originally established in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that a
job qualification test administered to potential police officers did not unlawfully
discriminate on the basis of race. Id. at 232.
12. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66.
13. 478 U.S. 30 (1986) (holding that a challenge to § 2 of the Voting Rights

Act must be accompanied by proof that the operation of a multi-member
electoral structure affected their ability to elect favorable candidates).
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exercised "discriminatory intent." He could rely on the
14
discriminatory results of such redistricting to establish his claim.
In any event, Congress found the Bolden burden of
"discriminatory intent" unacceptable since it would be too difficult
for Voting Rights Act plaintiffs to achieve. 15 Thus, Congress
amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982.16 Under this
amendment, plaintiffs could now establish a voting rights dilution
claim by demonstrating that minorities were denied an equal
chance to participate in the electoral process based upon the totality
of the circumstances. 17 Hence, Congress eliminated the
"discriminatory intent" requirement. Additionally, Congress stated
that the new vote dilution elements should not be guarantees of
proportional representation. 18 In order words, just because
minorities comprise twenty percent of a given population, does not
require a state to redistrict in order to guarantee that one of every
five legislators will be a minority member.
The Supreme Court interpreted this congressional amendment
for the first time in Gingles.19 In Gingles, plaintiffs challenged
existing multi-member state legislative districts. 20 A multimember district is one upon which more than one legislature is
elected to represent that district. These multi-member legislatures
are elected by way of at-large voting. That consists of the entire
voting population of a given area and the power to elect all of the
14. Id. at 43-44 n.8.
15. See Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325, 344 (E.D.L.A. 1983) ("'[T]he

Committee has concluded that this intent test places an unacceptably difficult
burden on plaintiffs."' (quoting S. REP. No. 97-417 (1975))).
16. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973(b) (1988)). Section 2
establishes that a violation of the right of any citizen to vote occurs if "it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the state
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
protected class of citizens." Id.
17. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79. In Gingles, the Court held that a vote
dilution challenge can only be established if under the "totality of
circumstances," the mechanisms resulted in unequal access to the electoral
process. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 43-79.
20. Id. at 35.
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representatives of that district's legislature. The process of at-large
elections for multi-member districts could potentially have a
disparate impact upon minority voters. For example, assume that a
district decides to become multi-member via at-large voting. It will
elect four legislators to the state senate. Minorities in the given
district comprise twenty-five percent of the district's population.
There is a great chance that the election results will ignore any
minority candidate. However, had this district decided to break
apart into four distinct single-member districts, with the twentyfive percent minority population comprising one of those districts,
that minority candidate would win an election in the minority
district. Consequently, the minority group would be represented.
The Gingles Court set forth a three-pronged test that a voting
rights plaintiff must pass in order to establish a voting rights
dilution claim.2 1 First, the minority group must be sufficiently
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district. 22 Second, the minority group must vote in
a politically cohesive manner. 23 Third, the minority's preferred
candidate is usually defeated by white bloc voting.24 The Supreme
Court has also applied the "Gingles test to the redistricting of
single-member districts. 25
II. THE 1994 SUPREME COURT AND THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT
The October 1994 Term of the Supreme Court produced two
significant cases in the area of the Voting Rights Act. These cases
both involved classic claims of minority vote dilution pursuant to

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.at 50-51.
Id.at 50.
Id.at 51.
Id.
See Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993) (holding that Gingles'

three-prong test applied to single-member districts).
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the amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.2 6 These cases
28
were respectively, Johnson v. De Grandy,27 and Holder v. Hall.
On the first day of the new Term, the Court heard arguments in
three consolidated appeals arising from challenges to the
redistricting of both houses of the Florida State Legislature in De
Grandy.29 On the same day, the argument was heard in Holder,
which involved a section 2 challenge to a single commissioner
30
form of county government.
The two cases involved two different voting situations. The De
Grandy case involved the redistricting of the Florida State
Legislature. 3 1 Holder involved a challenge to a form of county
government which contained a single commissioner, possessing
32
both legislative and executive power.
After the 1990 census, the Florida Legislature had to redistrict its
40 state Senate districts and 120 House districts in order to take
into account the new population figures from the 1990 census.
Florida has a unique provision in its state constitution which
provides that if a redistricting plan is not in effect within a certain
time period, the Florida Supreme Court will enter into the process
33
and will modify or enact a plan.
The Florida State Senate and House were unable to enact a
redistricting plan pursuant to the Voting Rights Act because the
Justice Department had refused to grant preclearance within the
allotted time frame for the legislature to enact such a plan.
Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court modified the legislature's
redistricting plan in order to address the objections that had been

26. See supra note 16.

27. 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994) (holding that plaintiffs satisfied Gingles'
"totality of circumstances" test for voter dilution under §2 of the Voting Rights
Act).
28. 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994) (holding that a challenge to the size of the
government body under § 2 cannot be brought in the absence of a definite and
reasonable standard by which to review such a challenge).
29. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
30. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2584.
31. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
32. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2584.
33. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2652-54.
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interposed by the Justice Department when it had refused to grant
preclearance.
At the same time of the Florida Supreme Court's review, a threejudge panel had been convened to hear various federal claims
relating to the redistricting. These claims were brought by Miguel
De Grandy, a Hispanic member of the Florida House and other
Hispanic voters, 34 which will be referred to as the De Grandy
plaintiffs, as well as claims asserting a consolidated action brought
by the Florida NAACP and African-Americans, 35 which will be
referred to as the NAACP plaintiffs, and the third action, as
36
indicated, brought by the United States.
The three-judge panel then adopted the Florida Supreme Court's
modified districting plan. Therefore, there was no need to seek
further preclearance by the Justice Department, and the panel then
considered the parties' various objections relating to the plan. 37
The three-judge panel applied the three-prong analysis set forth
in Gingles.3 8 It concluded that both the Florida House and Senate
redistricting plans violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in
that they permissibly diluted the voting strength of minority voters
in the Dade County area.3 9 As I stated earlier, the Gingles test
requires, as a precondition to a section 2 voter dilution claim, that
plaintiff demonstrate one, that the minority group is sufficiently
large and geographically compact to support a majority-minority
district; two, that the majority group is politically cohesive; and
three, that there is a pattern of polarized bloc voting.4 0
Following a trial, the three-judge panel found that the second and
third prong were satisfied in that blacks and Hispanics were
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 2651-52.
Id.
Id. at 2652.
Id. at 2656-59.
Id. at 2656.
Id. at 2652-56. However, the finding of vote dilution in the Senate seats

did not have a significant effect because solving the problem for the blacks
caused the problem for Hispanics and vice versa. Id. Thus, because the remedies

were mutually exclusive, the district court found that the fairest solution was to
defer to the decision of the state legislature. Id. at 2652-53. The Supreme Court
affirmed this decision. Id. at 2663.
40. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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separate politically cohesive groups, and that there was a high
41
degree of racially polarized voting in the Dade County area.
What we mean by politically cohesive is that their voting patterns,
as evidenced from election results, are the same.
Florida African-Americans and Hispanics do not vote similarly.
They have different interests, so they are two distinct politically
42
cohesive groups for purposes of the Gingles test.
In addition, with respect to the first factor, the three-judge panel
concluded that the De Grandy plaintiffs had shown that the Dade
County area districts could be redrawn to produce a total of four
Senate districts and eleven House districts, and that Hispanic
43
majorities would be geographically compact.
The court also found that the NAACP plaintiffs had shown that
the districts could be redrawn to create three Senate districts that
had black majorities and were geographically compact because the
plan only contained nine Hispanic majority-minority House
districts, three Hispanic majority-minority Senate districts, and two
44
black majority-minority Senate districts.
The three-judge panel concluded that the House plan unlawfully
diluted the voting strength of Hispanic voters and that the Senate
45
plan diluted the voting power of both blacks and Hispanics.
The court, in constructing a remedy for the section violation,
adopted a modified version of the De Grandy plaintiffs' House
plan, which provided for eleven Hispanic districts. 46 As to the
Senate plan, however, the court found that the plan could not be
redrawn to provide for both a fourth Hispanic district and a third

41. De Gran., 114 S. Ct. at 2653.

[T]he court found political cohesion within each of the Hispanic and
black populations but none between the two ... and a tendency of nonHispanic whites to vote as a bloc to bar minority groups from electing
their chosen candidates except in a district where a given minority makes
up a voting majority.
Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 2652.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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African-American district. 47 Here, the court found that the plans
submitted by the De Grandy plaintiffs, which provided four
Hispanic seats, would have wasted African-American votes by
patterning very large numbers of African-American voters into
only two Dade County districts and would have replaced a third
strong black plurality district with an oddly-shaped district running
from Fort Lauderdale all the way to Vero Beach, for anyone who is
familiar with the demographics of Florida.
The Court found that since the remedies for both section 2
violations were mutually exclusive, the challenged plan was
entitled to deference as representing the state's efforts to vote or to
create a plan that was the fairest to all ethnic communities. 4 8 This
is interesting because the very plan that the Court found to have
violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was the remedy which
was imposed in the case. Since a section 2 violation was inevitable,
as one ethnic group would have been diluted to have avoided
diluting the other, the plan reasonably split the difference by
dilution among both ethnic groups.
The State of Florida, the De Grandy plaintiffs, and the United
49
States all appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.
How that works in Voting Rights cases, unlike other types of cases
where the case goes before a single federal district judge, threejudge panels are enacted pursuant to the federal rules, and appeals
from the three-judge panel go directly to the United States
50
Supreme Court.
The State of Florida appealed the three-judge panel's finding of
the section 2 violation arguing that because of the percentage of
Hispanic Senate seats, three out of forty statewide, or seven and
one half percent, it is at least equal to the percentage of Hispanic
voters in the state which is seven percent. 5 1 Thus, the failure to
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.at 2663.
Id. at 2651-52.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1986). Section 1973(c) provides in pertinent

part: "Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of
three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and
any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." Id.
51. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2654-56.
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create a fourth Hispanic seat does not result in dilution in a section
2 violation. Similarly, the state argued that both its House and
Senate plans accurately reflected the percentage of Hispanics in the
52
voting-age population of the Dade County area.
Again, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act specifically states that
proportional representation of racial and ethnic groups is not
required. The state's argument, therefore, was that the existence of
proportional representation should create a safe harbor that renders
53
a redistricting plan immune from a section 2 challenge.
The United States and the De Grandy plaintiffs defended the
three-judge panel's finding of the section 2 violation as to the
Hispanics vote dilution in both the House and Senate plans, but
argued that they erred in failing to hold a full hearing on the scope
of available remedies before concluding that a fourth Hispanic
district court cannot be created without including African54
American voters.
The State of Florida's challenge to the finding of a section 2
violation provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to
clarify the requirements of section 2 in the context of a singlemember districting plan. Again, Gingles involved a multi-member
55
district.
In a prior Term of the Supreme Court, a case entitled Growe v.
Emison,5 6 involved a challenge to Minnesota's redistricting plan,
and it was held that the section 2 claims were subject to the threeprong Gingles test in single-member districts. 57 The issue,
therefore, that remained unsettled was how far a state had to go to
avoid vote dilution in creating single-member diistricts, or stated
another way, whether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as a
three-judge panel had found in De Grandy, required a state to
58
maximize the number of minority districts.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2654.
Id. at 2660.
Id. at 2653-54.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993).
Id. at 1084-85.
De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. at 2659.
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The three-judge panel in De Grandy seemed to think that section
2 of the Voting Rights Act would be violated unless Florida
affirmatively and consciously carved up the state along racial lines
to facilitate ethnic bloc voting to maximize the maximum extent
possible within the limits of geographic compactness. 59
Remember, with respect to the Senate plan, the three-judge panel
found that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act required both the
maximization of African-American districts and Hispanic districts
even though the court concluded that it was impossible to do so.60
During the Nassau County Charter Revision Process, I had been
informed by Commissioner Grasing that the term "Hispanic" does
not encompass Latinos. However, in order to simplify the cases, I
will use the term "Hispanic" to encompass Latinos as well. In
addition, Hispanics are the largest growing group following the
1990 census.
Now, the second reason why this case was of a particular
importance concerns the effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
a case entitled Shaw v. Reno.6 1 In Shaw, the Court, in a five-tofour decision, held that a claim is stated under the Equal Protection
Clause where the plaintiffs allege that a race-neutral redistricting
plan, "cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to
separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that
the separation lacks sufficient justification." 62 Shaw was not a

59. Id. at 2659-60. Justice Souter went on to denounce such a reading of
section 2 by stating:
One may suspect vote dilution from political famine, but one is not
entitled to suspect (much less infer) dilution from a mere failure to
guarantee a political feast. However prejudiced a society might be, it
would be absurd to suggest that the failure of a districting scheme to
provide a minority group with effective political power 75% above its
numerical strength indicates a denial of equal participation in the political
process. Failure to maximize cannot be the measure of Section 2.
Id. at 2660 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 2652-53.
61. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (holding that white voters could challenge an
irregularly shaped black majority congressional district).

62. Id. at 2828.
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Voting Rights Act case. The Shaw case was brought strictly on
63
equal protection grounds.
Let me just summarize a little bit. Shaw was a subject of an
extensive debate at last year's conference here at Touro. 64 Shaw
involved a challenge to North Carolina's decision to create a
second African-American majority-minority congressional district
by joining together a narrow district of approximately 160 miles
long, which was no wider than Interstate 1-85.65 The Washington
Post ran a story, I do not know if this is true as I have not driven on
1-85, but if you drove down 1-85 with both of your doors open, you
would kill everybody in the district. There are various points in the
district that apparently are that narrow.
The Court in Shaw expressly refused to decide whether the
Constitution permits the creation of majority-minority districts to
66
decide in a manner that could be explained in non-racial terms.
For example, where the redistricting, although race conscious,
demonstrates due regard for districting plans such as compactness.
More significantly, in Shaw, the Court expressly refused to reach
the plaintiffs' claim that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is
unconstitutional to the extent that it required the creation of a
bizarrely-shaped 1-85 district. 67 Earlier in that Term, the Court, in
a case entitled Voinovich v. Quilter,6 8 had similarly gone out of its
way to state that it was not expressing its view on the
unconstitutionality of a state's intentional creation of a majorityminority district to avoid a section 2 vote dilution claim. 69
63. Id. at 2824.

64. See Charles Stephen Ralston & Michael A. Carvin, Voting Rights
Debate, 10 TOURO L. REv. 415 (1994).
65. Id. at 2820-21.
66. Id. at 2825-27.
67. Id.
68. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993) (holding that intentional manipulations of
electoral districts to get majority-minority districts is permissible under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act where it is acting pursuant to remedy a prior violation of

§ 2).
69. Id. at 1158. The Court noted that it has yet to make a decision as to
whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies to voter-dilution claims. Indeed,

Justice O'Connor noted that the Court has "never held any legislative
apportionment inconsistent with the Fifteenth Amendment." Id. Regardless, the
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The pattern that can be seen here is that in some of these cases,
in Shaw specifically, the Court says very little in terms of giving
future guidance to the state legislatures in terms of what they
should do, and there is very little guidance from the different
opinions that make up these five-to-four decisions to allow other
courts to come up with standards or guidelines to apply. So the
cases that were in a number of courts had stated their actions
waiting for decisions, in De Grandy in particular, for guidance on
how they should rule. It was not to be. There are more questions
that are unanswered following these cases than there are questions
that are answered.
De Grandy was decided by a vote of seven-to-two. 70 Justice
Souter delivered the opinion. Let me read from Justice Souter's
decision. "We hold that no violation of [section] 2 can be found
here, where, in spite of continuing discrimination and racial bloc
voting, minority voters form effective voting majorities in a
number of districts roughly proportional to the minority voters'
respective shares in the voting-age population. '7 1 I was curious
when I was listening to Judge Lazer speak about that phrase
"roughly proportional." That was the same terminology as was
used in De Grandy.72 Justice Souter then stated:
While such proportionality is not dispositive in a challenge to
single-member districting, it is a relevant fact in the totality of the
circumstances to be analyzed when determining whether members
of the minority group have less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
73
representatives of their choice.
Now, in a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor emphasized that
the opinion did more than just reject the maximization theory that
had been set forth by the three-judge panel, that central to the
opinion was that proportionality, defined as the relationship
Court chose not to answer the issue of the Fifteenth Amendment's scope and
whether it applied to respondents in this case based on an erroneous finding of
intentional discrimination on the part of the Ohio Reapportionment Board. Id.
70. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. at2651.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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between the number of majority-minority voting districts and the
minority groups share of the relevant population, is always relevant
74
evidence in determining vote dilution, but is never dispositive.
Further, she stated that a lack of proportionality can never by itself
prove vote dilution, for courts must always carefully and
75
searchingly review the totality of the circumstances.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the district courts maximization theory was an
erroneous application of section 2.76 He went on to identify the
more difficult question of proportionality for which the statutory
text did not provide a clear answer. He was disturbed by the
concept of proportionality and that it could lead to segregation and
that single-member districts utilizing proportionality as a criteria is
a dangerous concept. 77 Justice Kennedy also pointed out that the
Court's decision in Shaw "did not resolve the broad question of
whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts,
'78
without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim."
He also made clear that the case did not present constitutional
claims but only claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.7 9
That language gives reason to believe that there were constitutional
claims presented in that case, thus, adding further confusion to
what the state of the law is today.
Now, what is also interesting about the two cases is that Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in De Grandy.80 They
dissented, calling attention to a fifty-four page concurring opinion
that Justice Thomas wrote in the Holder case. 81
Now, we get into the issue that I am sure students have heard of
in constitutional law, the debate between strict construction as to
74. Id. at 2664 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).

77. Id. at 2666 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that "[a]s
a general matter, the sorting of persons with an intent to divide by reason of race
raises the most serious constitutional questions." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 2666-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816, 2818 (1993)).

79. Id. at 2667 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the Reagan appointees, and the expansive view of the Constitution.
In Holder, Justice Thomas went through an exhaustive review of
the Court's prior precedence and concluded, and this is a radical
decision, that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not cover
any dilution challenges and that he would only apply section 2 to
state enactments that regulate citizen's access to the ballot or
processes for counting a ballot, that redistricting plans and
electoral mechanisms that may affect the weight given to a ballot
cast and counted, are beyond the purview of the Act.82 Justice
Thomas went through every case, every word of the statute, the
legislative history, and committee reports. Then he distinguished
them and found that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not
apply to redistricting plans. 83 As I said, that is a very radical
concept.
A review of the current case law shows, according to Justice
Thomas, that by construing the Act to cover dilutive electoral
mechanisms, the federal courts have been placed in a hopeless
position of weighing questions of political theory. 84 Justice
Thomas and Justice Scalia believe that there were no guidelines
85
nor benchmarks here with which to determine dilution claims.
Justice Thomas also found fault in the Court's approach to the
totality of the circumstances approach. 86 He contends that once a
plaintiffs group establishes that it is mathematically possible to
control a seat, (the first Gingles precondition), the size of
geographic compactness, and that it is a district, the only question
remaining is whether the current number of seats is proper, that
87
proportionality and mathematical ratios are the only test.
According to Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, the totality
82. Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2619 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas stated that the "text of the statute must control, and the text of

section 2 does not extend the Act to claims of dilution." Id. at 2613. (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
83. Id. at 2619 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas further stated that
the "terms do not include a State's or political subdivision's choice of one
districting scheme over another." Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 2591-92 (Thomas, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 2592 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2614-19 (Thomas, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2615 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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of the circumstances approach that the De Grandy opinion stressed,
is nothing but an illusion--that it would "more accurately be called
a test for enduring proportional electoral results according to
88
race."
In Holder, the Court limited its grant of certiorari to the question
of whether a single commissioner form of government, where one
individual, as I indicated, performed all executive and legislative
functions rather than a multi-member Board of Commissioners, is
subject to a vote dilution challenge in section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. 89 The Eleventh Circuit held that the use of such form
of government in Bleckley, Georgia, a rural county which had this
form of government since its creation in 1912, violated section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act because the creation of a five-member
governing commission using the same districting lines as the fivemember county school board that existed in that county, would
permit the election of an African-American commission. 90
Bleckley County has an African-American voting-age population
of twenty percent. 9 1 A five-to-four decision was rendered by the
Court, holding that the size of the governing body is not subject to
a vote dilution challenge under section 2 of the Voting Rights
93
Act. 92 The opinion was joined by Justices Thomas and Scalia.
There is no objective and workable standard for a reasonable
benchmark where a challenge is brought to a governing body's
size; there is no reason why one size should be picked over
another, and that accordingly, there will be no standards to apply
for future cases.
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Ginsburg. 94 The dissent focused on past precedent and
concluded that the "size of government body is a standard,
88. Id. at 2618 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated that the test

"is an empty incantation--a mere conjurer's trick that serves to hide the drive for
concurring).
proportionality that animates our decisions." Id. (Thomas,J.,
89. Id. at 2584.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2585.
Id. at 2584.
Id. at 2588.
See supranotes 81-88.
dissenting).
Holder, 114 S.Ct. at 2583 (Blackmun,J.,
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practice, and procedure" under section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. 95 Furthermore, minority voters may challenge the "dilutive
effects by demonstrating their potential to elect representatives
under an objectively reasonable alternate practice." 96 They
reasoned that since the Act was adopted for a broader purpose of
ridding the country of racial discrimination in voting, and based
upon precedent, then, the action begins with the broadest possible
scope. 97
CONCLUSION

To summarize, the Holder and De Grandy decisions failed to
provide any guidelines to help state and local governments to
perform the redistricting of the future, rather they create more
ambiguity. There is no definition as to what a reasonably compact
district is, or for that matter, what a compact district is. De Grandy
does tell us that even if Gingles' preconditions are satisfied, you
still have to look at the totality of circumstances. There is no
definition of totality of the circumstances. For state and local
governments, it will mean that more experts and consultants will
have to be retained and retained early in the process in order to
survive challenges based upon the Voting Rights Act. Here, there
is a cost factor.
I will now take any questions that anybody would have.
Audience Member:
In Jackson v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors,98 what case
did the plaintiffs cite for their argument?

95. Id. at 2619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

96. Id.at 2619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2619-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. 818 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the weighted voting

system used by the Nassau County Board of Supervisors violated the oneperson-one-vote principle under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional).
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FrankN. Schellace, Esq.:
There were a number of causes of action brought in that case,
including a Voting Rights Act cause of action. However, the
procedural posture of Jackson was a motion by the defendants that
had been made for summary judgment and Judge Spatt granted
summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the first cause of action on
equal protection grounds, finding that the weighted vote system
violated one-person-one-vote. 99
There had not been a finding of a violation of the Voting Rights
Act. However, one can argue that, to the extent in Nassau County-a wholly contained assembly district--that a minority district can
elect a majority-minority representative, had the case proceeded
forward, the court might have found a violation of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act. The case was decided distinctly on one-personone-vote, and the parties agreed to accept a county legislature as an
alternate form of government.

99. Id. at 534.
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